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INTRODUCTION 
 
Every day in the United States approximately fifty percent of 
adult consumers take at least one prescription drug.1 In 2005, 
American consumers spent over 200 billion dollars on prescription 
drugs,2 a number that is projected to rise to almost 500 billion by 
2016.3 As the amount of money American consumers spend on drugs 
rises, more American consumers struggle to pay for those drugs they 
need on a daily basis. Meanwhile, across the border in Canada, 
consumers pay up to forty percent less for the same drugs.4 The same 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology, Certificate in Intellectual Property; B.S.E. Chemical Engineering, May 
2005, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
1 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH POLL REPORT: PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
USE 1 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.kff.org/healthpollreport/feb_2005/1.cfm.  
2 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS FACT SHEET: MAY 
2007 UPDATE 1 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057_06.pdf. 
3 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS FACT SHEET: MAY 
2007 UPDATE 4 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057_06.pdf. 
4 Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Why We Pay So Much For Drugs, 
TIME, Feb. 2, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,1101040202-581399,00.html. 
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is true for the cost of drugs in many other countries throughout the 
world.5 Amid American consumers’ battle to pay for their drugs, 
profits are soaring for pharmaceutical companies. For instance, in 
2006, Pfizer reported $19.3 billion in profits,6 Merck reported $4.4 
billion in profits,7 and Abbott Laboratories reported $1.7 billion in 
profits.8 Many critics argue that the pharmaceutical companies are 
indifferent to American consumers’ financial struggle to pay for their 
drugs, putting their own profits before the public’s needs.9 Yet, the 
research and development of pharmaceutical companies has yielded 
countless drugs upon which the public has come to depend. 
The public has pressured Congress to follow the lead of other 
countries to help make drug prices more affordable for American 
consumers.10 Many countries outside of the United States regulate 
                                                 
5 Mike Adams, 28 Senators Vote to Maintain Big Pharma Monopoly Over U.S. 
Consumers; Republicans Oppose Free-Trade for Medicine, NEWSTARGET.COM, 
May 7, 2007, http://www.newstarget.com/z021831.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2007) 
(claiming Canadians, Europeans and Mexicans pay from one-half to one-tenth the 
price that American consumers pay for their prescription drugs). See also Gardiner 
Harris, The Nation: Prescriptions Filled; If Americans Want to Pay Less for Drugs, 
They Will, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003. 
6 PFIZER, PFIZER FINANCIAL REPORT 1 (2006), http://www.pfizer.com/investors/ 
financial_reports/financial_report_2006.jsp (select “Financial Summary” from drop 
down menu). 
7 MERCK, UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 10-
K 117 (2007), http://www.merck.com/finance/proxy/2006_form_10-k.pdf. 
8 ABBOTT, ABBOTT 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2006), http://www.abbott.com/ 
static/content/microsite/annual_report/2006/support_files/abbott_ar06_financial.pdf. 
9 Mike Hall, What Drug Companies Aren’t Telling YOU, America@work, May 
2003, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/publications/magazine/0503_ 
bigfix.cfm; Cf. MASSPIRG, Prescription Action Litigation Project, 
http://masspirg.org/health-care/safe-amp-affordable-drugs/prescription-action-
litigation-project (discussing class action lawsuit against major pharmaceutical 
companies for price gouging). 
10 See, e.g., H.R. 194, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing tax credits for persons of 
“retirement” age for their prescription drugs); Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 
2006, H.R. 4706, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposing depriving prescription drug 
manufacturers of certain tax deductions in an effort to lower drug prices); 
Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 2005, H.R. 563, 108th Cong. (2005) 
(proposing that the Secretary of Health and Human Services negotiate the lowest 
2
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their drug prices in one of three ways: (1) directly by price controls; 
(2) indirectly by reimbursement limits for social insurance used by 
their citizens; or (3) indirectly by profit controls.11 Pharmaceutical 
companies are forced to comply with these drug regulations, resulting 
in their brand name drugs being sold abroad at outwardly reduced 
prices.12  
Although Congress has shown an effort to consider some of these 
foreign cost-cutting methods, a large-scale change has not yet 
happened.13 In the meantime, some American consumers have taken it 
upon themselves to engage in potentially dangerous and illegal cost-
cutting measures. Some consumers report that they skip doses to make 
a prescription last longer or simply do not fill a prescription that they 
may need because of its cost.14 Other consumers have turned to 
seemingly legitimate online pharmacies that tout brand name drugs at 
a highly reduced cost,15 while still other consumers cross the border 
and buy prescription drugs in Canada or Mexico.16 
Recognizing the drug industry’s huge earnings and the public’s 
increasing demand for low-cost prescription drugs, creative 
entrepreneurs have explored ways to enter the lucrative prescription 
drug market. One way these entrepreneurs become involved is by 
                                                                                                                   
possible pricing for Medicare beneficiaries and provide waivers to allow importation 
of prescription drugs from Canada). 
11 Patricia M. Danzon, Making Sense of Drug Prices, REGULATION, Spring 
2000, 56, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n1/danzon.pdf. 
12 Id. 
13 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
14 Patricia Barry, Chasing Drugs: Many Readers Take Drastic Steps to Get 
Prescription Medicine, AARP BULLETIN, October, 2003, http://www.aarp.org/ 
bulletin/prescription/Articles/a2003-09-29-chasing_drugs.html. 
15 Id.; see also Michelle Meadows, Saving Money on Prescription Drugs, FDA 
Consumer, Sept.–Oct., 2005, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2005/ 
505_save.html. 
16 Barlett, supra note 4, at 1. See also HHS TASK FORCE, REPORT ON 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION IX (2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
importtaskforce/Report1220.pdf. 
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importing substandard or counterfeit drugs.17 A second way is by 
purchasing brand name drugs manufactured abroad and importing 
them into the United States, a practice known as parallel imports.18 
This practice is theoretically legal under U.S. law because it is only 
unlawful to re-import drugs originally manufactured in the United 
States but shipped for sale abroad.19 Genendo Pharmaceutical, N.V. 
(“Genendo”), a corporation based in the Netherlands, used this latter 
method in its course of business.20 However, in 2003, when Genendo 
attempted to import a shipment of Lipitor manufactured and packaged 
abroad by Pfizer (“the imported Lipitor”), the government seized the 
drugs at the border, and sought their condemnation as unapproved new 
drugs.21 The district court ruled in favor of the government on all 
counts.22 
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the court was presented with a 
question of statutory interpretation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 353 and 355, and 
                                                 
17 Calvert et al., Factory for Fake Prescription Drugs, THE SUNDAY TIMES 
(U.K.), Sept. 23, 2007, at Insight, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ 
tol/news/uk/health/article2511583.ece. 
18 United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th 
Cir. 2007). See also Press Release, Genendo Pharmaceutical, NV, Trial Challenging 
the FDA’s Pharmaceutical Importation Ban to Begin May 2nd, (Apr. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=145004. Parallel 
imports are genuine products (as opposed to counterfeit) that come from an area 
where the products are sold at discounted prices, in comparison to where the 
products will be imported (here, the U.S.).  
19 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2006). 
20 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. 
21 Id. at 1211. The process of seizure is based upon 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2006). 
Under the FDA’s Regulatory Procedures, the United States files a Complaint for 
Forfeiture, directs the United States Marshal to seize the article in contention, and 
requests the court to condemn the article and declare forfeiture for violation of the 
law. FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, at 6-1 (2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/rpm/. Seizing an article may be 
accomplished by either taking physical possession or placing in constructive custody 
of the court. Id. A condemned article is one in violation of the law. Id. Condemned 
articles may be disposed of in a variety of ways, including constructive destruction, 
sale, conversion or destruction. Id. at 6-1-11.  
22 Id. at 1219. 
4
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the corresponding Food and Drug Administration (“the FDA”) 
regulation.23 In deciding this issue, the Seventh Circuit followed the 
FDA’s proposed statutory interpretation.24 While the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision resulted in the correct outcome on the set of facts before it, 
the court’s interpretation limits the scope of the provision. The 
practical effect of the decision reduces the potential opportunity for the 
importation of otherwise safe drugs and thus reduces the potential 
benefits the statute represented to the drug-consuming population in 
the United States. However, at the same time, the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision may generate more attention and cause the import restrictions 
on prescriptions drugs to be investigated in a new light. 
This article will examine and explore what the repercussions of 
the Genendo decision are for the future of drug importation. Part I 
provides the background of the case. Part II introduces the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“the FDCA”) and the sections relevant 
to Genendo. Part III examines the district court decision and Part IV 
explains the Seventh Circuit’s decision. Part V analyzes the Seventh 
Circuit’s approach, and Part VI discusses the broader policy and 
practical implications of the Seventh Circuit’s decision.  
 
I. UNITED STATES V. GENENDO 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Genendo is a corporation headquartered in the Netherlands, which 
purchases, trades and sells pharmaceuticals.25 As part of its business, 
Genendo imports drugs into the United States that were both 
manufactured abroad and intended for distribution abroad.26 At the 
heart of the issue in this case is Lipitor manufactured by Pfizer in 
                                                 
23 United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2007).  
24 Id. at 962–63. 
25 United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1209 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
26 Id. 
5
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Ireland,27 and bought by Genendo in Argentina.28 Genendo planned to 
import the Lipitor into the United States to Phil & Kathy’s, an FDA-
approved repackaging and labeling facility29 located in Illinois.30 
Pursuant to a written agreement between Phil & Kathy’s and Genendo, 
Phil & Kathy’s would then repack and relabel the Lipitor.31 
In September and October of 2003, Genendo sent letters to the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office alerting the government of its plan to import 
the Lipitor to Phil & Kathy’s.32 Prior to these letters, Genendo 
unsuccessfully filed a declaratory judgment action to clarify its rights 
to import the Lipitor.33 Genendo subsequently went forward with the 
importation of the Lipitor, but, on December 16, 2003, the government 
seized the Lipitor on its way to Phil & Kathy’s.34 
Pfizer received an FDA-approved new drug application (“NDA”) 
for Lipitor.35 Under that NDA, Lipitor to be sold in the U.S. must be 
manufactured in Loughbeg, Ireland or Vega Baja, Puerto Rico and 
must be packaged in Freiburg, Germany, or Vega Baja, Puerto Rico.36 
Additionally, the NDA specifies that the labeling for Lipitor must be in 
English, and its expiration period is two years from the manufacture 
date.37  
The imported Lipitor was manufactured in the NDA-approved 
facility in Loughbeg, Ireland but was packaged in Guarulhos SP, 
                                                 
27 Id. at 1212.  
28 Id. at 1210. 
29 Id. at 1213. 
30 Id. at 1212. 
31 Id. The Agreement also covered Zocor imported by Genendo that was also in 
dispute. Id. at 1207. However, the Zocor ruling was not appealed and will not be 
addressed in this article. 
32 Id. at 1210. 
33 Id. at 1209–10. Genendo sought a declaration that importing the Lipitor was 
authorized under the FDCA; however, the district court granted a motion brought by 
the United States to dismiss the action because there was not an agency action ripe 
for review. Id. at 1210. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 1210. 
36 Id. at 1212. 
37 Id. 
6
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Brazil.38 Additionally, the imported Lipitor bore labels in Portuguese 
that displayed expiration dates three years from the manufacture 
date.39 
 
B. The Procedural Posture 
 
After seizing the imported Lipitor, the government brought suit 
against Genendo40 seeking condemnation of the imported Lipitor as 
both an unapproved new drug and as a misbranded drug.41 The 
government also sought a permanent injunction to prohibit Genendo 
from violating the FDCA with similar imports in the future.42 Genendo 
responded that the imported Lipitor was not an unapproved new drug 
or a mislabeled drug because it fell within the exemption of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 353(a) and 21 C.F.R. § 201.150.43 
The district court found for the government on all counts, 
resulting in the condemnation of the imported Lipitor and the entry of 
a permanent injunction against Genendo.44 Genendo appealed the 
district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit.45 The issue presented to 
the Seventh Circuit was whether the imported Lipitor was an 
unapproved new drug or whether the imported Lipitor was exempt 
from the NDA provisions under § 353.46 
Before analyzing the district court and Seventh Circuit decisions, 
more explanation of the FDCA and its relevant provisions is necessary. 
                                                 
38 Id. The Brazil facility is not listed as an approved facility on the NDA and 
has not been inspected by the FDA. Id. 
39 Id. at 1210–11. 
40 The United States also sued Phil & Kathy’s, but the parties entered into a 
consent decree settling their claims. Id. at 1212. 
41 Id. at 1207.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. As explained in more detail, infra at II.B., § 353(a) and § 201.150 
together state an exemption that drugs in transit to and held at a repackaging facility 
do not have to comply with certain labeling and packaging requirements of the 
FDCA. 
44 Id. at 1219. The analysis of the district court’s decision is discussed infra at 
III. 
45 United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2007). 
46 Id. at 962. 
7
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II. THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT 
 
A. Brief Overview of the FDCA 
 
The first Food and Drugs Act, passed in 1906, prohibited the 
introduction of misbranded and adulterated foods, drinks and drugs 
into interstate commerce.47 The 1906 Act was repealed in 1938 and 
replaced with the enactment of the current FDCA.48 Over the years, 
the FDCA has been amended over twenty times, and it currently 
regulates a wide range of products, including foods, dietary 
supplements, drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics.49 The FDA is the 
government agency charged with enforcing the FDCA.50 
The FDCA has two main goals underlying its enactment: safety 
and disclosure. The Supreme Court recently restated this first goal, 
stating that a “fundamental precept of the FDCA is that any product 
regulated by the FDA – but not banned – must be safe for its intended 
use.”51 The second goal, disclosure, is evident through the provisions 
demanding truthful information used in labels. This goal traces back to 
the 1906 Act, which was partially enacted to prevent the use of “cure-
                                                 
47 FDA: MILESTONES IN U.S. FOOD AND DRUG LAW HISTORY (1999), 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html. 
48 Federal Food Drug And Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397 (2004)). 
49 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397. 
50 FDA, Laws Enforced by the FDA and Related Statutes, 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/#amendments (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). The 
FDA is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Food and 
Drug Administration, FDA Organization, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/7org.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007). At the direction of Congress, the Secretary of HHS 
promulgates regulations. See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.150 (regulation promulgated in 
response to Congress’ instruction in 21 U.S.C. § 353). The FDA then uses these 
regulations in its enforcement of the FDCA. 
51 Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 142 (2000); See also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) 
(“The purposes of [the FDCA] thus touch phases of the lives and health of people, 
which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self 
protection.”). 
8
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all” claims for ineffective and often dangerous medicines.52 These 
provisions are still found in the current FDCA through misbranding 
prohibitions and labeling requirements.53 
 
B. The Relevant Sections of the FDCA 
 
The FDCA has a broad coverage; however, only two of its 
provisions are pertinent to the discussion here—section 355 involving 
new drug applications (“NDAs”) and § 353 involving exemptions for 
certain drugs under the FDCA. Also relevant is the regulation 
promulgated by the FDA in response to the mandate in § 353 from 
Congress, 21 C.F.R. § 201.150.54 Each of these provisions will be 
discussed in turn. 
In Genendo, the government asserted that the imported Lipitor 
was an unapproved new drug in violation of § 355(a).55 This section is 
complex and details the various requirements a pharmaceutical 
company must meet to gain FDA approval to market a “new” drug. A 
new drug is one not yet “generally recognized among experts . . . as 
safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . .”56 Under § 
355, an application for a new drug must be filed detailing, inter alia, 
the methods and facilities used for manufacturing, processing and 
packaging the drug.57 When the FDA grants approval of an NDA, the 
                                                 
52 FDA, MILESTONES IN U.S. FOOD AND DRUG LAW HISTORY (1999), 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html. 
53 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 352(a) (prohibiting introduction of 
misbranded drugs or drugs with false or misleading labels into interstate commerce, 
respectively); see also FDA, WHAT FDA REGULATES, http://www.fda.gov/ 
comments/regs.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (stating that the FDA “ensures that 
[the regulated products] are honestly, accurately and informatively represented to the 
public”). 
54 21 C.F.R. § 201.150 (1999) is often referred to as “the § 353 exemption.” 
This designation will be used in the remainder of this article. 
55 United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2007). 
56 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2006). 
57 Id. § 355(b)(1)(D). 
9
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drug may then be legally introduced into U.S. interstate commerce.58 
Pfizer submitted an NDA and obtained FDA approval for Lipitor; 
however, the imported Lipitor did not fully comply with that NDA.59  
Despite the non-compliance of the imported Lipitor with the 
NDA, Genendo argued that the drugs could lawfully be put into 
interstate commerce because they fell within the exemption stated in § 
353.60 That statute states in pertinent part: 
 
(a) Regulations for goods to be processed, labeled, or 
repacked elsewhere. The Secretary is hereby directed to 
promulgate regulations exempting from any labeling or 
packaging requirement of this Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.] 
drugs and devices which are, in accordance with the practice 
of the trade, to be processed, labeled, or repacked in 
substantial quantities at establishments other than those 
where originally processed or packed, on condition that such 
drugs and devices are not adulterated or misbranded under 
the provisions of this Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.] upon 
removal from such processing, labeling, or repacking 
establishment.61 
 
The government, however, argued that the imported Lipitor did 
not fall within the language of § 353; rather, the § 353 exemption 
promulgated by the FDA exempted Genendo from compliance with 
only the six packaging and labeling requirements listed in the § 353 
exemption.62 The § 353 exemption states in pertinent part: 
 
(a) Except as provided by paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section, a shipment or other delivery of a drug which is, in 
accordance with the practice of the trade, to be processed, 
                                                 
58 Id. § 355(a). 
59 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 960–61. The non-compliance of the imported Lipitor 
with the NDA was admitted by Genendo. Id. at 961. 
60 Id. 
61 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
62 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962. 
10
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labeled, or repacked in substantial quantity at an 
establishment other than that where originally processed or 
packed, shall be exempt, during the time of introduction into 
and movement in interstate commerce and the time of 
holding in such establishment, from compliance with the 
labeling and packaging requirements of sections 501(b) [21 
U.S.C. § 351(b)] and 502 [21 U.S.C. § 352] (b), (d), (e), (f), 
and (g) of the act . . . . 63 
 
The six subsections listed in the § 353 exemption generally set forth 
conditions under which a drug shall be considered adulterated or 
misbranded.64 The statutory interpretation of § 353, and its 
corresponding regulation, are at the center of the dispute in Genendo. 
 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
The United States government sought condemnation of the 
imported Lipitor on various grounds: first, as an adulterated drug 
under 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) that did not comply with the FDA’s 
continuing Good Manufacturing Practices (“cGMP”);65 second, as a 
                                                 
63 21 C.F.R. § 201.150(a) (1999). Since this regulation was written, § 502(d) 
has been repealed. Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, 
§ 126, 111 Stat. 2296, 2327 (1997). 
64 Specifically, § 351(b) states that a drug shall be considered adulterated “[i]f 
it purports to be or is represented as a drug . . . and its strength differs from, or its 
quality or purity falls below, the standard set forth in [an official] compendium. . . .” 
21 U.S.C. § 351(b). Sections 352(b), (e), (f) and (g) refer to package form and 
contents of the label, designation of drugs by established names, directions for use 
and warnings on the label, and representations as recognized drugs. 
65 Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Permanent Injunction ¶¶ 
31–40, United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (No. 03 C 6495), 2003 WL 23799518. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) states that a 
drug shall be considered adulterated “if it is a drug and the methods used in, or the 
facilities or controls used for, its manufacture, processing, packing or holding do not 
conform to or are not operated or administered in conformity with current good 
manufacturing practice to assure that such drug meets the requirements of this Act 
[21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.] as to safety and has the identity and strength, and meets 
the quality and purity characteristics, which it purports or is represented to possess.” 
11
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misbranded drug under 21 U.S.C. § 352(c) that did not bear labels in 
the English language;66 third, as a misbranded drug under 21 U.S.C. § 
352(f) that did not bear adequate directions for use;67 and finally as an 
unapproved new drug that was manufactured abroad and not 
manufactured, processed and packaged (including its labeling) and 
held in full compliance with the NDA for Lipitor.68 Specifically, the 
government argued that any drug that does not display the exact label 
approved in the NDA is an unapproved new drug.69 The government 
also alleged that no exemptions promulgated by the FDA applied to 
the drugs to excuse Genendo from compliance with the English-
language and directions for use labeling requirements.70  
Genendo asserted several affirmative defenses in response: (1) the 
drugs were not misbranded;71 (2) the drugs were not new;72 (3) 
Genendo’s activities did not fall within § 331(k) or § 351(a)(2)(B);73 
(4) the English label and adequate directions for use label 
requirements did not apply to Genendo because Genendo does not 
label the drugs—those requirements only apply to Phil & Kathy’s for 
                                                                                                                   
The actual violation alleged is of 21 U.S.C. §331(k), which prohibits any person 
from causing the “alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the 
whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a 
food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale 
(whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and results in 
such article being adulterated or misbranded.” 
66 Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Permanent Injunction, supra 
note 65, ¶¶ 41–45. 21 U.S.C. § 352 and its implementing regulations, such as 21 
C.F.R. § 201.15, set forth detailed requirements for drug labels, including that the 
information appear “prominently and conspicuously” in English so that an ordinary 
person buying and using the drug can read and understand the label. 
67 Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Permanent Injunction, supra 
note 65 ¶¶ 46–48. 
68 Id. ¶¶ 49–52. 
69 Id. ¶ 50. 
70 Id. ¶¶ 44, 47. 
71 Genendo's Verified Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Amended 
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Permanent Injunction, United States v. 1500 
90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 03 C 6495), 2004 WL 
2174705 (first and sixth affirmative defenses). 
72 Id. (first and fifth affirmative defenses). 
73 Id. (third affirmative defense). 
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the relabeled product, which the government cannot allege has been 
violated since the drugs were seized prior to relabeling;74 (5) the FDA 
has effectively prohibited parallel drug importation and thus exceeded 
its statutory and regulatory authority.75  
The district court proceedings focused on whether the § 353 
exemption excused Genendo from fully complying with the NDA for 
Lipitor. Siding with the government, the district court held that “a new 
drug’s failure to be manufactured and/or packaged according to the 
exact requirements of an FDA- approved NDA are not exempted by § 
353(a) of the Act.”76 The district court based its holding upon its 
reading of the FDCA provisions and Seventh Circuit precedent.77 The 
district court quoted United States v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. for the 
proposition that “the detailed requirements of the new drug approval 
process of § 355 reflect ‘a Congressional view that the way in which 
drugs are mixed and packaged is no less important than the chemical 
makeup of the drugs.’”78 The district court also relied upon Baxter for 
the rule that a drug must comply with all requirements of the NDA in 
order to be properly introduced into interstate commerce.79 The district 
court also found that Genendo’s proposed reading of the § 353 
exemption would eviscerate the protections of the new drug approval 
process.80 The court “harmonized” the § 353 exemption with the new 
drug approval process by giving “packaging” and “labeling” their 
general meaning throughout most of the act, but giving these terms 
special meanings within the NDA provisions.81 Packaging and labeling 
generally refer to “a type of packaging with descriptive terms” where 
                                                 
74 Id. (fourth affirmative defense). 
75 Id. (seventh affirmative defense). Genendo also alleged that it did not own, 
import or control the vast majority of the drugs seized by the FDA. Id. (second 
affirmative defense). This defense will not be addressed in this article. 
76 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1214. 
77 United States v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1990). 
78 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (citing Baxter, 901 F.2d at 
1411). 
79 Id. The Seventh Circuit in Baxter did not state such a proposition. See 
Baxter, 901 F.2d at 1411. 
80 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1216. 
81 Id. at 1217. 
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within the NDA provisions, it takes on the special and more specific 
meaning, which includes the “‘methods used in, and the facilities and 
controls used for, the . . . processing and packing of such drug.’”82 
According to the district court, this interpretation harmonized the two 
seemingly conflicting provisions while still honoring the sense and 
purpose of each.83  
Finally, the district court rejected Genendo’s argument that 
Kaybel84 should affect the court’s decision. The court distinguished 
this case because the repackaged drugs in Kaybel were compliant with 
the NDA, unlike the imported Lipitor in the present case.85 In the end, 
the district court ruled that the imported Lipitor was subject to 
condemnation as an unapproved new drug and permanently enjoined 
Genendo from introducing any other unapproved new drugs into 
interstate commerce.86 
 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
 
Genendo appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh 
Circuit.87 The only issue on appeal was whether the imported Lipitor 
was a new drug.88 The Seventh Circuit framed the question as whether 
§ 353(a) exempted Genendo from compliance with the NDA 
requirements, which as a question of statutory interpretation was 
subject to de novo review.89 The court thus first had to confront the 
question of the level of deference to give the FDA’s interpretation of § 
353.90  
                                                 
82 Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D)). 
83 Id. 
84 United States v. Kaybel, 430 F.2d 1346 (3d Cir. 1970). 
85 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1217–18. 
86 Id. at 1218–19. 
87 The case proceeded on appeal under the name United States v. Genendo 
Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. May 10, 2007). 
88 Id. at 962. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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Genendo argued that the statutory language and Congressional 
intent were clear and that under Chevron91 the court must give effect to 
that intent and not defer to the FDA’s interpretation of the statute.92 
Genendo argued that the language of § 353 clearly states that “as long 
as the imported, properly manufactured drug is en route to or at the 
repacker, it is exempt from any packaging and labeling 
requirements.”93 As proof of congressional intent, Genendo relied 
upon a statement by Senator Copeland in which he stated that 
substances “need not be labeled, and so forth, until after they are ready 
actually to be sent on to the ultimate consumer.”94 Thus, since the 
imported Lipitor was on its way to Phil & Kathy’s, it could not be an 
unapproved new drug or misbranded due to its non-English labels, 
allegedly inadequate directions for use, or longer expiration date 
periods, since no labels were necessary at all.95 According to Genendo, 
these deficiencies in the labels were all to be corrected at Phil & 
Kathy’s, pursuant to the written 201.150 Agreement between them, 
and the labeling and packaging requirements only applied once the 
drugs were outbound from Phil & Kathy’s.96 
                                                 
91 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). Under Chevron’s analysis, a court must first look to see if Congress has 
spoken to the precise issue. Id. at 842. If they have, that is the end of the inquiry, as 
both the agency and the court must adhere to that unambiguous intent. Id. at 842–43. 
If, however, Congress has not spoken on the issue or the intent is ambiguous, the 
court must ask whether the agency’s construction of the statute is a permissible one. 
Id. at 843. The legislative regulation that Congress has left to the agency must be 
given deference unless its construction is arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary 
to the statute. Id. at 843–44. The deference that the court gives to a federal agency in 
this situation is now known as “Chevron deference.” See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (using the 
term “Chevron deference”); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 389 
(1999) (referring to the “usual rule of Chevron deference”); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 
U.S. 478, 495 (1990) (using the term “Chevron deference”). 
92 Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 C 
6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *16–17. 
93 Id. at *17 (emphasis in original). 
94 Id. at *13–14 (quoting Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, A Statement of 
its Legislative Record, 74th Cong. 363 (1938 reprinted 1987)). 
95 Id. at *24. 
96 Id. at *28. 
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The government argued that the district court decision was 
correct. First, the government stated that the FDA’s interpretation of § 
353 through its regulation was entitled to great deference under 
Chevron.97 Without much explanation, the government stated that the 
statutory language is ambiguous, and since the FDA was charged with 
making a regulation that carries the force of the law, its interpretation 
should be respected.98 The government echoed much of the district 
court’s decision but went on to state that if Congress had intended to 
exempt all of the NDA requirements under § 353, they could have 
written that exemption into the statute themselves.99 The government 
also disparaged Genendo’s reliance upon Senator Copeland’s 
statements because his statement was only useful to show that the 
statute’s language was now requiring the FDA to promulgate a 
regulation rather than authorizing the FDA to do so.100  
The Seventh Circuit held that the FDA’s interpretation deserved 
Chevron deference.101 In doing so, the court first asked whether 
Congress had spoken to the precise issue.102 The court stated that 
“[Section] 353 simply directs ‘the Secretary’ to promulgate regulations 
exempting drugs en route to a repackager from labeling packaging 
requirements; it does not itself provide for a complete exemption.”103 
The court relied on Arner Co. v. United States104 to support the 
proposition that Congress would have stated the exemption on its own 
rather than provide for a regulation to formulate one.105 The court 
rejected Genendo’s argument that Congress had spoken to the issue by 
turning to the regulation promulgated by the FDA: 
                                                 
97 Brief for the Appellee United States, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 
F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 03 C 6495), 2006 WL 4820664, at *21. 
98 Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)).  
99 Id. at *24. 
100 Id. at *25. The government contends that there is nothing in the legislative 
history to suggest that Congress intended to exempt drugs from the new drug 
approval requirements. Id. at *24–25. 
101 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962. 
102 Id. at 962. 
103 Id. at 962–63. 
104 142 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1944). 
105 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963. 
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The problem with Genendo's argument is that it largely 
ignores the fact that the promulgated regulation, § 
201.150, sets forth specific labeling and packaging 
requirements from which drugs being repackaged are 
exempt. The particular sections of the FDCA referenced in 
§ 201.150 relate to [specific] requirement[s about the 
packaging] . . . . Section 201.150 thus does not exempt 
drugs in transit to or at a repackager from all labeling and 
packaging requirements in the Act, as Genendo suggests--
simply those listed. 
 Thus the statute is not so crystal clear as Genendo 
insists.106 
 
The court then turned to an investigation of the meaning of the 
word “any” within § 353. The statutory language reads in pertinent 
part: 
 
The Secretary is hereby directed to promulgate regulations 
exempting from any labeling or packaging requirement of this Act 
drugs . . . which are, in accordance with the practice of the trade, 
to be processed, labeled, or repacked in substantial quantities at 
establishments other than those where originally processed or 
packed, on condition that such drugs . . . are not adulterated or 
misbranded under the provisions of this Act upon removal from 
such processing, labeling, or repacking establishment.107 
 
The court turned first to a dictionary for the meaning of “any,” noting 
that the first definition is “‘one, a, an, or some’” while the fourth 
definition is “all.”108 The court then states:  
 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
108 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963 (citing WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED THIRD 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 96 (2d ed. 2001)). 
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Although the statute could be read as if any meant all . . . it 
could also be read to [mean] some . . . . Given that § 
201.150 exempts drugs in transit only from specified 
labeling and packaging requirements, the Secretary 
apparently understood it to mean the latter.109 
 
In a footnote, the court addressed a recently decided Supreme 
Court case cited by Genendo in which the Supreme Court construed 
“any” air pollutant to mean “all” air pollutants.110 The court 
distinguished this precedent on the basis that the Supreme Court was 
construing language in the Clean Air Act, which contained a 
“sweeping” definition of air pollutant, whereas the exemption in § 353 
does not contain a similar sweeping definition or otherwise indicate 
that “any” should be so construed.111 The court concludes that the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation in Massachusetts was a specific case 
where “any” meant “all” but that the holding was not so broad as to 
mandate that this definition be applied in every other case.112 
The court concluded that both Genendo’s and the FDA’s readings 
of the statute were possible interpretations, and thus that there was 
enough ambiguity in the statute such that the court should defer to the 
FDA’s chosen interpretation, provided the interpretation was not 
arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.113 The court 
found that this standard was met and that the interpretation was in line 
with the court’s “observation in Baxter that the new drug approval 
process ‘illustrates a congressional view that the way in which drugs 
are mixed and packaged is no less important than the chemical 
makeup of the drugs at issue.’”114 The court noted that under 
Genendo’s interpretation, drugs not packaged in conformity with the 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 963 n.3. The Supreme Court decision being discussed is 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
111 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963 n.3.  
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 963–64. 
114 Id. at 964 (citing United States v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1401, 
1411 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
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NDA, such as the imported Lipitor packaged in Brazil, but 
subsequently repackaged under the § 353 exemption successfully 
avoid the NDA’s requirement that original packaging occur in an 
approved facility.115 The court stated that “If such a result were 
intended, we believe that the statute and accompanying regulation 
would say so explicitly.”116 
Genendo argued that the Third Circuit’s holding in United States 
v. Kaybel117 mandated a different result. In Kaybel, the court held that 
a wholesale distributor did not introduce an unapproved new drug into 
interstate commerce when it repackaged the drug without obtaining a 
new drug application in its own name first.118 The court distinguished 
Kaybel on two grounds. First, Kaybel did not deal directly with § 
353.119 Second, the facts of Kaybel involved the repackaging of a drug 
that was compliant with the NDA in all respects.120 The court 
emphasized that Kaybel’s rationale was that other provisions exist to 
protect drugs from being contaminated by repackagers, and this 
rationale did not apply to the facts before it.121 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
 
Based on the set of facts before it, the Seventh Circuit correctly 
decided Genendo. The court’s reasoning, however, is problematic. The 
court began by noting that the issue before it was one of statutory 
interpretation—whether Genendo was exempt under § 353 from 
complying with the NDA provisions—which subjected the district 
court’s holding to de novo review.122 This led into the main issue of 
what level of deference the court should give the FDA’s interpretation 
                                                 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 430 F.2d 1346 (3d Cir. 1970). 
118 Id. at 1347. The drug manufacturer, Searle, obtained an NDA in its own 
name for the drug which was still in effect when the defendant repackaged the drug 
into smaller bottles for sale. Id. 
119 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 965. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962. 
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of § 353(a).123 The court determined that the statute is ambiguous and 
that it must defer to the reasonableness of the FDA’s interpretation.124 
The overarching question is how the court arrived at its conclusion 
that the statute is ambiguous. The court’s analysis would be sounder if 
they examined whether Congress spoke to the issue, steered away 
from reliance upon dictionary definitions, and considered the 
legislative history and other sections of the FDCA in its investigation. 
 
A. The Chevron Analysis 
 
1. The Vague Intent of Congress 
 
Under the first step of the Chevron125 analysis:  
 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 126 
 
The court stated that Genendo believed Congress had spoken directly 
to the issue with § 353 by using the phrase “any labeling and 
                                                 
123 Id. at 962. 
124 Id. at 964. 
125 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
126 Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted). 
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packaging requirement.”127 The court found this argument problematic 
because the § 353 exemption lists specific labeling and packaging 
requirements with which a repackaged drug does not have to 
comply.128 The court concluded that the § 353 exemption “thus does 
not exempt drugs in transit to or at a repackager from all labeling and 
packaging requirements in the Act, as Genendo suggests—simply 
those listed.”129 On this point, the court is correct. In its brief, Genendo 
stated that as a result of the language Congress used in § 353, the FDA 
had “no option but to promulgate a regulation that exempted drugs en 
route to and while being held by a repacker and labeler from all of the 
labeling and packaging requirements of the Act. The FDA ‘performed 
this prescribed duty’ when it promulgated [the § 353 exemption].”130 
However, it is hard to see how Genendo can argue the FDA correctly 
performed its duty by exempting all packaging and labeling 
requirements when instead its regulation specifically lists only six of 
those requirements.131  
Despite this flaw in Genendo’s argument, the court nevertheless 
missed the most important part of the argument: just because the 
regulation lists six specific packaging and labeling exemptions does 
not mean Congress failed to speak directly to the issue. There is 
always the possibility that the regulation is improper and has ignored 
the direct mandate of Congress. Judicial review of such administrative 
constructions is in place to prevent such occurrences. A court is the 
final authority on statutory construction and it must reject any 
administrative construction that is inconsistent with “clear 
congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory 
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”132  
                                                 
127 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962. 
128 Id. at 963. 
129 Id. 
130 Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *14. 
131 The six requirements listed as exempted are sections 501(b) and 502 (b), (d), 
(e), (f), and (g). 21 C.F.R. § 201.150(a). 
132 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
n.9 (1984) (citations omitted); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic 
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Here, the court only superficially investigated congressional 
intent. The only statutory interpretation tool the court consulted was a 
dictionary definition.133 Relying on Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 
of the English Language, Second Edition, as its dictionary of choice, 
the court stated that “the first definition given for the word any is ‘one, 
a, an, or some’” while, of course, “all” is not until the fourth 
definition.134 By itself, this approach is questionable. How did the 
court determine that the Second Edition of Webster’s Unabridged was 
the dictionary with the right definition? A cynical answer is that it was 
simply the dictionary sitting on the desk of the law clerk at the time.  
However, a different Webster’s Dictionary first defines “any” as 
“[o]ne, no matter which, of more than two” and provides “some, no 
matter how much or how little, how many, or what kind” as the second 
definition.135 In the Oxford English Dictionary, the first definition of 
“any” is “[a]n indeterminative derivative of one, or rather its 
weakened adj. form . . . [i]ts primary use is in interrogative, 
hypothetical and conditional forms of speech” without regard to 
kind.136 Oxford’s second definition is “[w]ith a specially quantitative 
force = A quantity or number however great or small.”137 The 
American Heritage Dictionary’s first definition of “any” is “[o]ne, 
some, every, or all without specification.”138 Thus, it would appear 
that if the court consulted any (“any” meaning “all” here) of these 
dictionaries, the court could have simply picked the dictionary with 
the most favorable definition. 
If Congress had intended to exempt repackaged drugs from all 
packaging and labeling requirements, they could have expressly put 
                                                                                                                   
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (stating that a court must reject 
any administrative construction that is inconsistent with Congress’ statutory 
mandate). 
133 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963. 
134 Id. 
135 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 64 (4th ed. 2000). 
136 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 538 (2d ed. 1989). 
137 Id. at 539. 
138 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2000) (emphasis added). 
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that language into the statute, as the court implied.139 However, the 
argument also swings the other way. Congress could have either used 
the word “some” in place of “any” in § 353 or defined “any” within § 
353 if they did not mean to exempt the drugs from all labeling and 
packaging requirements. Congress did not do either of these. 
Rather than solely relying upon a dictionary definition, the court 
could have consulted other sections and subsections of the FDCA for 
guidance. For example, the word “any” is used twenty-five times other 
than the disputed instance in § 353 alone.140 A brief glance at these 
other uses of “any” demonstrates that “any” cannot mean “some” in 
every single use of the word. Nor can “any” mean “all” in each 
instance. This suggests that finding the right definition for this 
particular instance is likely not as easy as flipping open the dictionary 
and using the first definition. The word has to be read in context of 
both the specific section and the entire statute. 
More importantly, the court could have consulted the legislative 
history of § 353. The entire FDCA went through many versions, 
resulting in various congressional reports and floor debates.141 One 
such report notes that: 
 
Section 503 [21 U.S.C. § 353] prescribes exemptions from 
labeling requirements for drugs and devices similar to 
those provided for food when the articles are to be 
processed, labeled, or repacked at points other than their 
place of production and when, after the processing, 
labeling, or repacking they comply with the terms of the 
law . . . .142 
 
In its brief, cited Senator Copeland, the sponsor of the FDCA, on the 
Senate floor: 
 
                                                 
139 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 962–63.  
140 See 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2000). 
141 HARRY A. TOULMIN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FOOD, DRUGS AND 
COSMETICS § 7 (1942). 
142 Id. at § 251 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 75-2139 (1938)). 
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[P]erhaps the Senator did not know that on line 3 we have 
stricken out the word "authorized" and have provided that 
the Secretary shall be directed. The Secretary is directed to 
promulgate regulations exempting from labeling such 
articles as those to which the Senator has referred. 
 I am satisfied that with this change, which was 
suggested by the Senator from Michigan [Mr. 
Vandenberg], directing the Secretary to take such action, 
we are not leaving the matter to anybody. The Secretary 
must do what the Senator seeks to have done when the 
substances covered by the provision are shipped in large 
quantities and are not sold to the consumer. They need not 
be labeled, and so forth, until after they are ready actually 
to be sent on to the ultimate consumer. So I feel that under 
subsection (1) the industry in which the Senator is 
interested is fully protected, in view of the fact that we 
have not given the Secretary any option in the matter, but 
he must perform this prescribed duty.143 
 
Another Legislative statement shows the reasoning behind this 
prescribed duty: “This exemption is necessary to avoid unwarranted 
interference with certain legitimate commercial operations, such as the 
canning of food at branch canneries and delivery to a central plant for 
labeling, or the bulk shipment of crude drugs for processing and 
repacking before distribution to consumers.”144 A House Report also 
explained that, with respect to the food, “these exemptions will apply 
only where the interests of consumers will not be jeopardized.”145  
These congressional statements, when read together, demonstrate 
that it was the intent of Congress that the exemptions apply so that 
certain legitimate commercial operations would not be interfered with, 
so long as the consumer’s interests would not be jeopardized. The 
legislative intent, demonstrated by these statements, was to protect the 
                                                 
143 Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *13–*14 (emphasis in original). 
144 S. REP. NO. 73–493, at 9 (1934). 
145 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2139, at 6 (1938). 
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consumer. This legislative intent supports the ultimate result in 
Genendo and would give more credibility to the court’s reasoning. 
However, Genendo did not base its holding on this congressional 
intent. Rather, the court held that the statutory language was 
ambiguous enough to merit turning to the FDA’s interpretation of the 
rule.146 
 
2. The Reasonableness of Agencies 
 
Once a court has determined that it will defer to an agency’s 
interpretation, its holding is rarely disturbed because of the high 
arbitrary and capricious standard.147 In Genendo, it would be hard to 
argue that the FDA’s interpretation was arbitrary, capricious or 
manifestly contrary to the statute. The regulation only exempts the 
packaging and labeling requirements “that the package contain the 
name and address of the manufacturer or distributor, a statement of the 
quantity of the contents, the established name of the drug, active and 
inactive ingredients, and adequate warnings and directions for use.”148 
This leaves in place other provisions mandating proper handling of 
drugs to ensure their safety. The court correctly points out that the 
interpretation appears to be “consistent with the public health concerns 
animating the new drug approval process and the FDCA as a 
whole.”149 It is important to keep in mind that the agency 
interpretation need not be the only permissible interpretation nor does 
it have to be the interpretation at which the court would have reached 
if construing the statute on its own.150 
Accordingly, Genendo’s interpretation raises an interesting 
question as to whether its interpretation would have been permissible 
had it been the position advanced by the FDA. Genendo claimed that 
exempting the imported Lipitor from all packaging and labeling 
                                                 
146 Genendo 485 F.3d at 963–64. 
147 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984). 
148 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963. 
149 Id. at 964. 
150 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
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requirements did not put consumers at any risk because both § 353 and 
the § 353 exemption still contained a requirement that the drugs not be 
adulterated or misbranded.151 Thus, any deviations from the NDA that 
occurred before the drugs were repackaged would still result in the 
drugs being properly seized as misbranded or adulterated.152 The court 
in Genendo stated that “even assuming a flawless repackaging process 
at Phil & Kathy’s . . . certain deviations from the NDA’s requirements 
are never rectified despite the repackaging. Notably, the fact that the 
Lipitor was packaged at an unapproved facility in Brazil can never be 
brought into compliance with the NDA.”153 Genendo’s response was 
that Congress and the FDA determined through § 353 and the § 353 
exemption that the only NDA requirement that needed to be complied 
with when a drug is being imported is that it was manufactured in an 
NDA-approved, and thus FDA-approved, facility.154 The result of this 
regulatory scheme would adequately safeguard consumers.155 
If this were the FDA’s interpretation and the government’s 
argument before the court, the court would likely have to defer to it. 
“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation.”156 If the FDA determined that 
consumers were adequately safeguarded by such a construction, then 
the interpretation would also be in line with the underlying purposes of 
the FDCA. Courts are typically viewed as unqualified to determine 
whether the agency’s interpretation is correct. Instead courts must 
defer to the agency because their interpretation is considered 
reasonable.157  
 
 
                                                 
151 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 964. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *23. 
155 Id. 
156 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984). 
157 Id. at 844. 
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2. Other Bumps in the Road: Distinguishing the Case Law 
 
On the way to reaching the correct result, the court also had to 
face some case law that appeared to be on point. First, the court faced 
the Supreme Court’s new decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,158 in 
which the Supreme Court construed “any air pollutant” to mean “all” 
air pollutants.159 While this decision would seem quite relevant, the 
Genendo court correctly disposed of this argument in a footnote. As 
discussed infra, the word “any” cannot be given a single meaning 
within § 353 itself. Thus, it is hard to imagine that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of “any” in a completely different Act could be 
the definitive meaning of the word in § 353 as well. 
The court also had to deal with the Kaybel case from the Third 
Circuit.160 The Kaybel case is easily distinguishable from the facts at 
bar because the drugs in Kaybel were packaged at an NDA-approved 
facility.161 In addition, neither § 353 nor the § 353 exemption are at 
issue in Kaybel.162 Genendo’s argument is that the Kaybel court’s 
holding is that, “when a valid NDA is in place for the solid oral dosage 
form of a drug, deviations from the packaging and labeling listed on 
the NDA do not convert approved solid oral dosage forms of drugs 
into ‘unapproved new drugs.’”163 Genendo reiterated their version of 
this holding again as “packaging and labeling do not affect a drug’s 
status as an approved ‘new drug.’”164 However, with these statements, 
Genendo repeatedly overstates the holding in Kaybel. The Kaybel 
court never stated that where a drug was packed is irrelevant to 
whether it is a “new drug.” The Kaybel court, in fact, says very little in 
its short opinion. The Seventh Circuit correctly dismisses Kaybel as 
having very little applicability to the set of facts before it. 
                                                 
158 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
159 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963 n. 3. 
160 United States v. Kaybel, 430 F.2d 1346 (3d Cir. 1970). 
161 Id. at 1347. 
162 Id. 
163 Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *6. 
164 Id. at *16. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING 
 
A. Packaging Concerns and Health Considerations 
 
The FDCA was put in place to protect consumers from the 
inherent dangers accompanying the drug production process. Both the 
district court and Seventh Circuit were correctly concerned that 
imported Lipitor came from an unapproved packaging facility in 
Brazil. As the Seventh Circuit noted, there was no way of knowing the 
conditions under which the imported Lipitor was originally packaged 
and no way of later correcting any of these deficiencies at a repacking 
facility such as Phil & Kathy’s.165  
The FDCA takes these packaging considerations into account in 
various places. For instance, under § 351(a)(2)(A), a drug will be 
considered adulterated “if it has been prepared, packed or held under 
insanitary conditions whereby it may have been contaminated with 
filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health . . . .” 
These same concerns with packaging are reflected in numerous other 
places throughout the Act.166 
Could these packaging provisions have acted as a check on the 
behavior of parties such as Genendo and Phil & Kathy’s? Consider a 
hypothetical situation the same as ours here. The Lipitor is 
manufactured at an FDA-approved facility, but packaged at a facility 
in Brazil that is not FDA-approved, and instead of being seized at the 
border, the drugs enter the United States and are successfully 
repackaged at Phil & Kathy’s. According to Genendo’s argument, the 
imported Lipitor—and “any other similarly manufactured, packaged, 
labeled, and unadulterated drugs Genendo would import in the 
future”—would not be unapproved new drugs or misbranded because 
they are exempt from the labeling and packaging requirements of the 
                                                 
165 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 964. 
166 See e.g., 21 U.S.C. §351(a)(2)(B) (2000) (stating that a drug that is 
adulterated if the method of its packing does not conform to good manufacturing 
practices). 
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FDCA while on their way to Phil & Kathy’s.167 This argument 
assumes that the drugs are unadulterated, claiming immunity from 
being unapproved new drugs nor misbranded. However, if the drugs 
were packaged in Brazil under insanitary conditions, they are by 
definition adulterated and subject to seizure.168 This is true without 
relying upon a statutory construction of § 353 that prohibits any 
importation of drugs that are not fully compliant with an NDA. The 
argument that the drugs are unapproved new drugs becomes moot. 
Conversely, if the drugs packaged in Brazil are not exposed to 
insanitary conditions, they are not adulterated.169 However, they would 
still fail to comply with the NDA because they were packaged in a 
different packaging facility, the labels are not in English, and the 
expiration period is different.170 Thus, under the current statutory 
interpretation, they would be unapproved new drugs subject to 
seizure.171 But what is the harm to the consumer in this case? None of 
the concerns with unsafe drugs resulting from insanitary packaging 
would come into play.172 This would then allow parties such as 
Genendo to import drugs lawfully into the United States for 
distribution, after a repackaging facility such as Phil & Kathy’s 
ensures that all of the proper labels, expiration dates, and other 
relevant information are placed on the drugs. Consumers would 
benefit by gaining access to another source to obtain safe and effective 
medication with full and accurate disclosures. 
Finally, in the situation that the imported drugs were 
manufactured in an unapproved manufacturing facility, Genendo’s 
                                                 
167 Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *5 (emphasis added). 
168 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(A) (2000) 
169 Id. 
170 United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1212 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
171 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 963–64. 
172 Id. at 964. 
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own argument admits that such drugs are unapproved new drugs 
subject to seizure.173  
 
B. Does Genendo Foreclose All Parallel Imports? 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the statute effectively 
prevents the majority of parallel imports. Any drug that a company 
such as Genendo wants to import will have to be purchased after it has 
been manufactured and packaged at an NDA- approved, and thus 
FDA-approved, facility. In the present case, this would leave Genendo 
with only the possibility of buying Lipitor from Frieburg, Germany or 
Vega Baja, Puerto Rico and not Sao Paulo, Brazil.174 The probable 
reason the Brazilian facility is not an FDA-approved packaging 
facility175 is because the drugs being packaged there are intended for 
distribution abroad. Pfizer has no reason to go through a rigorous FDA 
inspection for approval of its Brazilian facility if they do not plan for 
those drugs to enter the United States. This begs the question as to 
why Pfizer would even allow Genendo to purchase the Lipitor in 
Brazil. It clearly is not in Pfizer’s interests to have that Lipitor sold in 
the United States or else the company would be doing that itself. 
Meanwhile, if Genendo is limited to purchasing drugs 
manufactured and packaged at an FDA-approved facility, it will have 
to ensure that the only deviations from the NDA are those listed in the 
§ 353 exemption.176 This could be a hefty task, especially without 
access to the company’s manufacturing and packaging information. It 
is easy to see how the transaction costs quickly rise in such a situation 
making it unfeasible for someone other than the drug’s own 
                                                 
173 Brief for Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *12. 
174 Genendo, 485 F.3d at 961. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 963. Again, those listed exemptions “relate to the requirement that the 
package contain the name and address of the manufacturer or distributor, a statement 
of the quantity of the contents, the established name of the drug, active and inactive 
ingredients, and adequate warnings and directions for use.” Id. 
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manufacturer to import the drug into the United States. Thus, the 
parallel import is effectively prohibited. 
If this is the result Congress intended, it could have drafted the 
original statute accordingly. Congress has demonstrated that it is 
capable of drafting such a section to prevent certain types of imports 
when it drafted § 381. That section prohibits anyone other than the 
manufacturer from re-importing into the United States drugs originally 
manufactured within the United States but shipped abroad for 
distribution.177 In that same regard, Congress could have responded 
with later legislation accomplishing this goal. 
This brings to the forefront the question of why has Congress not 
yet acted to explicitly declare parallel imports either legal or illegal? 
The cynical answer is that Congress is unduly influenced by the 
pharmaceutical lobby, whose interest it is to block the passage of a 
statute explicitly allowing parallel imports.178 The pharmaceutical 
lobby maintains more than 600 lobbyists, more than one lobbyist for 
each member of Congress.179 These lobbyists spent $435 million in 
Washington from 1996 to 2003, and doled out almost fifty-eight 
million dollars in contributions.180 
Despite the presence of this strong lobby, it is clear that 
something needs to be done by Congress. In its first argument to the 
court, Genendo stated that parallel imports would have a cost saving 
result for American consumers181and much of American public echo 
this sentiment.182 There are also those on the other side of the argument 
who take the view that such imports will result in minimal savings for 
American consumers.183 Both sides of the argument have some merit, 
but it is Congress’ job to arrive at a conclusion. An unbiased report 
                                                 
177 21 U.S.C. § 381(d) (2006). 
178 Barlett, supra note 4, at 1, 3.  
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *i. 
182 See, e.g., HHS TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 65 (noting that consumers 
import drugs because they believe save money by buying outside of the United 
States). 
183 Danzon, supra note 11; HHS TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at XI, XIII. 
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would greatly assist Congress in this task. The process will have to be 
transparent so that it can be ensured neither the pharmaceutical lobby 
nor any “pro-import” group can unfairly effect the outcome. 
Furthermore, the public needs to be educated; a greater understanding 
of the true benefits and downfalls of drug importation will help dispel 
many myths that currently exist184 and help ensure that the public 
understands the final compromise reached by Congress. 
However, while the debate in Congress goes on, many Americans 
will continue to import their drugs in other ways, such as through 
online pharmacies or by driving to Canada or Mexico, all the while 
facing the threat that the drugs they buy will be part of the twenty-five 
percent counterfeit or substandard drugs found in developed 
countries.185 Consumers are in an impossible position – they must 
choose between not getting any drugs at all because they cannot afford 
them, or getting drugs from outside the United States and taking a 
chance of suffering adverse consequences if the drugs are not safe. 
Consumers should not have to face this risk. This defeats the whole 
purpose of Congress’ attempt to protect consumers and ensure the 
safety of their drugs through the FDCA.186 
In order to reduce the amount of American consumers forced to 
turn outside our borders for their drugs, the FDA inspection process at 
our borders needs report. The FDA is already overburdened with the 
usual load of imports it must inspect on a daily basis. In 2001 at a 
House Committee hearing, Representative Greenwood reported that in 
the course of one month U.S. Customs detained 16,000 shipments in 
the Los Angeles mail facility alone, yet only had time to inspect 1,900 
                                                 
184 See, e.g., Gracie Marie Turner, Drug Importation Myths Debunked, TRI-
STATE MEDIA, June 20, 2007, http://www.tristate-
media.com/articles/2007/06/20/warricknews/editorial/01drug.txt; Nina Owcharenko, 
Debunking the Myths of Drug Importation, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, July 20, 
2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm542.cfm. Note that the 
accuracy of these “myths” may also be questioned. 
185 PFIZER, CASE STUDY: COUNTERFEIT CONTENTS, http://www.pfizer.com/ 
files/products/CounterfeitContents.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
186 See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
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of those shipments.187 The other shipments continued on to their 
destinations without any FDA inspection.188 The Department of Health 
and Human Services confirms the burden on the FDA, stating that the 
“FDA currently does not have sufficient resources to ensure adequate 
inspection of current levels and categories of personal shipments of 
prescription drugs entering the U.S.”189 
If parallel imports, like that in Genendo, are explicitly made legal, 
what can be done to improve this deficient inspection process? One 
step would be to follow the lead of Genendo. Genendo twice notified 
the government of its intention to import Lipitor into the United States 
after trying to obtain a declaratory judgment that its actions were 
legal.190 This notification probably gave the government sufficient 
knowledge to seize the imported Lipitor in the first place.191 
Subsequent importers should be required to follow this practice. 
Putting the burden on the importer to notify the United States may 
help facilitate inspections and ensure the quality of drugs entering the 
country. Importers seeking to avoid inspection will of course not 
follow such protocol. However, the importers who do abide by such a 
procedure will be the legitimate ones and the burden on the FDA 
would thus be lightened and would allow them to devote more time to 
stopping rogue importers. A second necessity is that the FDA simply 
needs more help. This is only going to come through additional 
funding from Congress. The inspection process cannot become more 
efficient with the current FDA importation field staff of 450 
workers.192 More people working on inspections means that more safe 
drugs will be properly allowed into the United States, and more 
importantly, more unsafe drugs will be stopped at our borders. 
 
                                                 
187 PFIZER, CASE STUDY: BILLION DOLLAR BUSINESS, http://www.pfizer.com/ 
files/products/BillionDollarBusiness.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
188 Id. 
189 HHS TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at XI. 
190 United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1210 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005). 
191 Brief of Appellant, Genendo Pharm. N.V., Genendo, 485 F.3d 958 (No. 03 
C 6495), 2006 WL 498561, at *3. 
192 HHS TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at X. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The facts of Genendo193 cast an interesting light over the on-going 
debate over how to lower prescription drug prices. The court’s holding 
in Genendo was correct under the facts before it. It was unclear 
whether the imported Lipitor had in fact been originally packaged 
under sanitary conditions. The court erred on the side of safety. 
However, in arriving at this holding, the court’s statutory 
interpretation of § 353 reduced opportunities for the importation of 
safe drugs. The result is that U.S. consumers will not benefit from a 
safe and inexpensive alternative drug source and may be forced to turn 
once again to drastic measures in order to save money on drug 
purchases. The court’s attempt to promote the safety and welfare of 
American prescription drug consumers thus has the opposite intended 
effect: consumers are forced to weigh the choice of having no drugs at 
all, or gambling that far cheaper drugs purchased abroad or on black 
markets will be safe and effective. This certainly was not the goal of 
the court in issuing its decision, and it certainly is not a decision 
American consumers should have to make.  
This is not an easy issue to resolve. Few consumers would 
question the requirement that the manufacturing and packaging plants 
be inspected and approved. The rigorous approval process is why 
consumers feel safe in using the drugs they receive in the United 
States.194 However, few consumers would also question the need to 
lower the costs of prescription drugs. How does Congress balance the 
consumer need for cheap, effective prescription drugs with the 
enormous research and development costs pharmaceutical companies 
must somehow recoup? 
American consumers are not waiting around for Congress to 
answer this question. They will continue importing drugs from abroad 
                                                 
193 485 F.3d 958. 
194 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH POLL REPORT: VIEWS ON 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SAFETY (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
healthpollreport/feb_2005/3.cfm (noting that Eighty percent of the population feels 
at least “somewhat” comfortable with the safety of prescription drugs they 
purchase). 
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until congressional action is taken. By going out on their own and 
purchasing potentially counterfeit or substandard drugs, American 
consumers undermine Congress’ goal of providing safe and effective 
drugs through the FDCA. Congress needs to specifically address the 
import issue in order to curtail this growing problem. This will require 
Congress to stand fast in the face of the powerful pharmaceutical 
lobby, which has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo. To 
ensure that it does not appear to be catering to the pharmaceutical 
lobby, Congress needs to be unbiased and as transparent as possible in 
the process of making a decision.  
Congress also needs to ensure that better mechanisms be put in 
place to ensure that counterfeit and substandard drugs are not entering 
the United States, lawfully or not. Congress must ensure that the 
health of the majority of Americans who depend on prescription drugs 
on a daily basis is not jeopardized.195 As part of this, the FDA 
inspection process needs to become more efficient. More inspections 
need to take place at our borders. This will require an increase in the 
number of FDA staff performing inspections, which in turn will 
require increased FDA funding. As more packages detained by the 
FDA are checked, the safety and efficiency goals of the FDCA are 
more fully served. These are legitimate but difficult policy issues that 
need to be addressed in the very near future. 
                                                 
195 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 1. 
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